Discussion:
The Dr. Strangelove Behind The "Axis Of Evil"
(too old to reply)
nkdatta8839
2003-12-22 23:33:40 UTC
Permalink
By REUTERS
Filed at 11:51 a.m. ET

Father of Pakistani Bomb Questioned Over Iran Link

ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's atom
bomb, is being questioned about reports of possible links between the
Pakistani and Iranian nuclear programs, the Pakistani government said
Monday.

The move follows investigations by the U.N.'s nuclear agency. Tehran
has acknowledged using centrifuge designs that appear identical to
ones used in Islamabad's nuclear weapons program.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan told Reuters Khan was being
questioned in connection with the ``debriefings'' taking place of
several scientists working at his Khan Research Laboratories, a
uranium enrichment plant near Islamabad.

``He is too eminent a scientist to undergo a normal debriefing
session,'' Masood Khan said. ``However, some questions have been
raised with him in relation to the ongoing debriefing sessions.''

The spokesman denied reports that Khan was ``under restriction'' and
gave no other details.

Several intelligence sources told Reuters however the scientist, who
is a national hero for developing a nuclear bomb tested in 1998 to
rival India's, had not been allowed to receive visitors at his home in
Islamabad nor to leave it since last week.

One intelligence official said the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation had taken part in the questioning.

``It is a routine matter,'' said one of the sources, who did not want
to be identified. ``We are debriefing every nuclear scientist, so Dr
Qadeer is facing the same formality.''

Diplomats in Vienna told Reuters last month the U.N.'s International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was investigating whether blueprints for
Iran's centrifuge had come from someone in Pakistan or elsewhere.

Tehran, accused by Washington of trying to develop nuclear weapons,
told the IAEA it had got them from a ``middleman'' whose identity the
agency had not determined, a Western diplomat told Reuters at the
time.

KEY U.S. ALLY

Pakistan, a key U.S. ally in the ``war on terror,'' denies exporting
nuclear technology and specifically denies any link to Iran's nuclear
program.

Sunday, authorities said Yasin Chohan, one of three Khan Laboratories
scientists detained earlier in the month, had been allowed home after
a ``personnel dependability and debriefing session.'' It said two
others, Mohammad Farooq, and another identified only as Saeed, were
``still undergoing debriefing.''

Opposition politicians have condemned the investigations as a
``national insult'' and a capitulation to American pressure.

It was inevitable the spotlight of the Iran probe would turn to Khan,
who worked in the 1970s at a uranium enrichment plant run by
British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco.

According to diplomats close to the Vienna-based IAEA, the centrifuge
designs used by Iran were of a machine made by the plant in the
Netherlands.

In 1983, after his return to Pakistan, Khan was sentenced in absentia
to four years' jail by an Amsterdam court for attempted espionage, a
decision later overturned on appeal.

Earlier this year, Washington announced commercial sanctions on Khan
Research Laboratories for allegedly arranging the transfer of
nuclear-capable missiles from North Korea to Pakistan, a decision
Islamabad protested.
Virendra Verma
2003-12-23 14:46:21 UTC
Permalink
Post by nkdatta8839
By REUTERS
Filed at 11:51 a.m. ET
Father of Pakistani Bomb Questioned Over Iran Link
Shows how bull-headed Americans are? (bull-headed means more might
than brain) They always protect the evil and don't shy away to attack
innocent countries. This attitude will be the ultimate downfall of
America which is not far.

I always opine that Chanese and Pakis will teach America the lesson
they will never forget. That day is coming closer and closer.
nkdatta8839
2003-12-23 18:22:38 UTC
Permalink
By REUTERS
December 23, 2003
Filed at 8:06 a.m. ET

Pakistan Says Its Iran Nuke Probe Hints at Greed

ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Pakistan admitted on Tuesday that scientists
involved in its atom bomb program may have been driven by ``personal
ambition or greed'' to export technology to Iran, but added the
government had no part in any such deals.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan said Pakistan was determined to
get to the bottom of allegations that nuclear technology may have been
transferred to Iran.

He said it began questioning scientists from a state-run laboratory
set up by the father of its bomb program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, five to
six weeks ago after approaches by the U.N.'s International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and information from the Iranian government that
``pointed to certain individuals.''

``There are indications that certain individuals might have been
motivated by personal ambition or greed. But we have not made a final
determination,'' he said.

He stressed that the government itself had never been involved in
nuclear proliferation. ``It takes its responsibility as a nuclear
weapons state very seriously,'' he said.

``The government of Pakistan has not authorized or initiated any
transfers of sensitive nuclear technology or information to other
countries,'' he said. ``This is out of the question.''

The spokesman said anyone involved in any nuclear technology transfers
would be punished: ``Nobody is above the law.''

On Monday, Islamabad revealed that A.Q. Khan, revered as a national
hero for developing a nuclear bomb tested in 1998 to match that of
rival India, was being questioned in connection with ``debriefings''
of several scientists working at his Khan Research Laboratories, a
uranium enrichment plant near Islamabad.

IDENTICAL CENTRIFUGE DESIGNS

The admission came after diplomats said last month that the IAEA was
probing a possible link between Iran and Pakistan. This followed
Tehran's acknowledgement that it had used centrifuge designs that
appeared identical to ones used in Islambad's quest for the bomb.

Tehran, accused by Washington of seeking to develop nuclear arms, told
the IAEA it had obtained the designs from a ``middleman,'' a Western
diplomat said at the time.

On Sunday, Islamabad said Yasin Chohan, one of three Pakistani
scientists detained earlier in the month, had been allowed home after
a ``personnel dependability and debriefing session.'' It said two
others, Mohammad Farooq, and another identified only as Saeed, were
``still undergoing debriefing.''

On Monday, Bush administration officials said Pakistani President
Pervez Musharraf had assured Washington that his government had not --
at least ``in the present time'' -- provided any nuclear secrets to
countries like Iran and North Korea.

White House spokesman Scott McClellan called Musharraf's personal
assurances ``important'' and added that close cooperation between the
United States and Pakistan in the war on terrorism would continue --
despite any transfers of nuclear technology and know-how that might
have taken place in the past.

Past allegations of Pakistani technology transfers, not only to Iran
but also to North Korea, have been an embarrassment for the White
House, which relies on Pakistan as a key ally in its battle against al
Qaeda and allied Islamic militants.

It was inevitable that the spotlight of the Iran probe should turn to
A.Q. Khan, who worked in the 1970s at a uranium enrichment plant run
by British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco.

According to diplomats, the centrifuge designs used by Iran were of a
machine made by the Dutch enrichment unit of Urenco.

In 1983, after his return to Pakistan, Khan was sentenced in absentia
to four years' jail by an Amsterdam court for attempted espionage, a
decision later overturned on appeal.

Earlier this year, Washington announced commercial sanctions on Khan
Research Laboratories, alleging it had arranged transfer of
nuclear-capable missiles from North Korea to Pakistan. Islamabad
protested over the decision.
================================================================================
By REUTERS
Filed at 11:51 a.m. ET

Father of Pakistani Bomb Questioned Over Iran Link

ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's atom
bomb, is being questioned about reports of possible links between the
Pakistani and Iranian nuclear programs, the Pakistani government said
Monday.

The move follows investigations by the U.N.'s nuclear agency. Tehran
has acknowledged using centrifuge designs that appear identical to
ones used in Islamabad's nuclear weapons program.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan told Reuters Khan was being
questioned in connection with the ``debriefings'' taking place of
several scientists working at his Khan Research Laboratories, a
uranium enrichment plant near Islamabad.

``He is too eminent a scientist to undergo a normal debriefing
session,'' Masood Khan said. ``However, some questions have been
raised with him in relation to the ongoing debriefing sessions.''

The spokesman denied reports that Khan was ``under restriction'' and
gave no other details.

Several intelligence sources told Reuters however the scientist, who
is a national hero for developing a nuclear bomb tested in 1998 to
rival India's, had not been allowed to receive visitors at his home in
Islamabad nor to leave it since last week.

One intelligence official said the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation had taken part in the questioning.

``It is a routine matter,'' said one of the sources, who did not want
to be identified. ``We are debriefing every nuclear scientist, so Dr
Qadeer is facing the same formality.''

Diplomats in Vienna told Reuters last month the U.N.'s International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was investigating whether blueprints for
Iran's centrifuge had come from someone in Pakistan or elsewhere.

Tehran, accused by Washington of trying to develop nuclear weapons,
told the IAEA it had got them from a ``middleman'' whose identity the
agency had not determined, a Western diplomat told Reuters at the
time.

KEY U.S. ALLY

Pakistan, a key U.S. ally in the ``war on terror,'' denies exporting
nuclear technology and specifically denies any link to Iran's nuclear
program.

Sunday, authorities said Yasin Chohan, one of three Khan Laboratories
scientists detained earlier in the month, had been allowed home after
a ``personnel dependability and debriefing session.'' It said two
others, Mohammad Farooq, and another identified only as Saeed, were
``still undergoing debriefing.''

Opposition politicians have condemned the investigations as a
``national insult'' and a capitulation to American pressure.

It was inevitable the spotlight of the Iran probe would turn to Khan,
who worked in the 1970s at a uranium enrichment plant run by
British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco.

According to diplomats close to the Vienna-based IAEA, the centrifuge
designs used by Iran were of a machine made by the plant in the
Netherlands.

In 1983, after his return to Pakistan, Khan was sentenced in absentia
to four years' jail by an Amsterdam court for attempted espionage, a
decision later overturned on appeal.

Earlier this year, Washington announced commercial sanctions on Khan
Research Laboratories for allegedly arranging the transfer of
nuclear-capable missiles from North Korea to Pakistan, a decision
Islamabad protested.
================================================================================
nkdatta8839
2003-12-23 18:33:10 UTC
Permalink
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3341037.stm

BBC News
Monday, 22 December, 2003, 15:33 GMT

Nuclear secrecy prevails in Pakistan
By Owen Bennett-Jones

The Pakistan Government's acknowledgement that it is investigating
some of its top nuclear scientists marks a significant departure from
Islamabad's standard claim that its record on non-proliferation is
"impeccable".

Doubts about Pakistan's non-proliferation record first emerged in the
late 1990s when it became clear that Islamabad's Ghauri missiles,
which have a range of up to 3,000 kilometres, were an improved version
of North Korea's Nodong system.

The question was what Pakistan had given North Korea in return for the
missile technology.

The Ghauri missiles were developed at the Kahuta laboratories
(recently renamed the Khan Research Laboratories), just outside
Islamabad, under the guidance of the so-called father of the Pakistani
bomb, Doctor AQ Khan.

Ever since 1974, when Islamabad decided it had to match Delhi's
nuclear capability, Pakistan has had two, rival nuclear programmes.
One has been run by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Agency (PAEC) and the
other by Dr Khan.

After the fall of Afghanistan's Taleban rulers, there were more
questions about Pakistan's non-proliferation record. Rumours
circulated that retired Pakistani nuclear scientists had been living
in Kabul, possibly helping Islamic extremists develop a dirty bomb.

Sanctions

Last year, one retired scientist was taken in for questioning by the
Pakistani authorities and later released.

In recent years American officials have discussed the possibility that
Islamabad could be a proliferator. But either because of a lack of
hard evidence, or a desire not to create problems for a key ally in
the war on terror, the US has tended to play down its concerns.

Nevertheless, earlier this year, Washington did impose sanctions on
the Khan Research Laboratories, citing concerns about missile
technology transfers.

Reports in the US media that Pakistan may also have helped Iran and
Libya develop nuclear technology have once again focused attention on
the role of Dr Khan, a man who has always enjoyed financial and
bureaucratic support from the military.

While it is possible that some retired scientists went to work in
neighbouring Afghanistan on their own initiative, it is difficult to
imagine that Kahuta scientists would have been able to share nuclear
technology with North Korea, Libya or Iran without the knowledge of
some senior army officers.

If that did happen civilian leaders may well have been kept in the
dark.

Two-time Pakistani Prime Minster Benazir Bhutto once complained that
even when she was running the government she was unable to visit the
Kahuta laboratories.

Saudi visit

Suggestions that Libya and Pakistan have co-operated in the nuclear
field go back many years. When he first decided that Pakistan should
build a bomb there were claims that the then Prime Minister, Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto, approached Libya for finance.

While there was never proof that any funds were provided, there was
speculation at the time that Libya would not provide funds without
expecting something in return.

Other countries have expressed an interest in Pakistan's nuclear
know-how.

In August 1999 - the year after India and then Pakistan declared
themselves as nuclear powers - the Saudi Crown Prince and Defence
Minister, Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, visited Kahuta amid such secrecy that
a Pakistani spokesman at the time denied the minister had ever been
there.

And in May 2000 an Urdu language Pakistani newspaper reported that the
Information Minister of the United Arab Emirates had also visited
Kahuta.
================================================================================
By REUTERS
December 23, 2003
Filed at 8:06 a.m. ET

Pakistan Says Its Iran Nuke Probe Hints at Greed

ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Pakistan admitted on Tuesday that scientists
involved in its atom bomb program may have been driven by ``personal
ambition or greed'' to export technology to Iran, but added the
government had no part in any such deals.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan said Pakistan was determined to
get to the bottom of allegations that nuclear technology may have been
transferred to Iran.

He said it began questioning scientists from a state-run laboratory
set up by the father of its bomb program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, five to
six weeks ago after approaches by the U.N.'s International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and information from the Iranian government that
``pointed to certain individuals.''

``There are indications that certain individuals might have been
motivated by personal ambition or greed. But we have not made a final
determination,'' he said.

He stressed that the government itself had never been involved in
nuclear proliferation. ``It takes its responsibility as a nuclear
weapons state very seriously,'' he said.

``The government of Pakistan has not authorized or initiated any
transfers of sensitive nuclear technology or information to other
countries,'' he said. ``This is out of the question.''

The spokesman said anyone involved in any nuclear technology transfers
would be punished: ``Nobody is above the law.''

On Monday, Islamabad revealed that A.Q. Khan, revered as a national
hero for developing a nuclear bomb tested in 1998 to match that of
rival India, was being questioned in connection with ``debriefings''
of several scientists working at his Khan Research Laboratories, a
uranium enrichment plant near Islamabad.

IDENTICAL CENTRIFUGE DESIGNS

The admission came after diplomats said last month that the IAEA was
probing a possible link between Iran and Pakistan. This followed
Tehran's acknowledgement that it had used centrifuge designs that
appeared identical to ones used in Islambad's quest for the bomb.

Tehran, accused by Washington of seeking to develop nuclear arms, told
the IAEA it had obtained the designs from a ``middleman,'' a Western
diplomat said at the time.

On Sunday, Islamabad said Yasin Chohan, one of three Pakistani
scientists detained earlier in the month, had been allowed home after
a ``personnel dependability and debriefing session.'' It said two
others, Mohammad Farooq, and another identified only as Saeed, were
``still undergoing debriefing.''

On Monday, Bush administration officials said Pakistani President
Pervez Musharraf had assured Washington that his government had not --
at least ``in the present time'' -- provided any nuclear secrets to
countries like Iran and North Korea.

White House spokesman Scott McClellan called Musharraf's personal
assurances ``important'' and added that close cooperation between the
United States and Pakistan in the war on terrorism would continue --
despite any transfers of nuclear technology and know-how that might
have taken place in the past.

Past allegations of Pakistani technology transfers, not only to Iran
but also to North Korea, have been an embarrassment for the White
House, which relies on Pakistan as a key ally in its battle against al
Qaeda and allied Islamic militants.

It was inevitable that the spotlight of the Iran probe should turn to
A.Q. Khan, who worked in the 1970s at a uranium enrichment plant run
by British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco.

According to diplomats, the centrifuge designs used by Iran were of a
machine made by the Dutch enrichment unit of Urenco.

In 1983, after his return to Pakistan, Khan was sentenced in absentia
to four years' jail by an Amsterdam court for attempted espionage, a
decision later overturned on appeal.

Earlier this year, Washington announced commercial sanctions on Khan
Research Laboratories, alleging it had arranged transfer of
nuclear-capable missiles from North Korea to Pakistan. Islamabad
protested over the decision.
================================================================================
By REUTERS
Filed at 11:51 a.m. ET

Father of Pakistani Bomb Questioned Over Iran Link

ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's atom
bomb, is being questioned about reports of possible links between the
Pakistani and Iranian nuclear programs, the Pakistani government said
Monday.

The move follows investigations by the U.N.'s nuclear agency. Tehran
has acknowledged using centrifuge designs that appear identical to
ones used in Islamabad's nuclear weapons program.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan told Reuters Khan was being
questioned in connection with the ``debriefings'' taking place of
several scientists working at his Khan Research Laboratories, a
uranium enrichment plant near Islamabad.

``He is too eminent a scientist to undergo a normal debriefing
session,'' Masood Khan said. ``However, some questions have been
raised with him in relation to the ongoing debriefing sessions.''

The spokesman denied reports that Khan was ``under restriction'' and
gave no other details.

Several intelligence sources told Reuters however the scientist, who
is a national hero for developing a nuclear bomb tested in 1998 to
rival India's, had not been allowed to receive visitors at his home in
Islamabad nor to leave it since last week.

One intelligence official said the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation had taken part in the questioning.

``It is a routine matter,'' said one of the sources, who did not want
to be identified. ``We are debriefing every nuclear scientist, so Dr
Qadeer is facing the same formality.''

Diplomats in Vienna told Reuters last month the U.N.'s International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was investigating whether blueprints for
Iran's centrifuge had come from someone in Pakistan or elsewhere.

Tehran, accused by Washington of trying to develop nuclear weapons,
told the IAEA it had got them from a ``middleman'' whose identity the
agency had not determined, a Western diplomat told Reuters at the
time.

KEY U.S. ALLY

Pakistan, a key U.S. ally in the ``war on terror,'' denies exporting
nuclear technology and specifically denies any link to Iran's nuclear
program.

Sunday, authorities said Yasin Chohan, one of three Khan Laboratories
scientists detained earlier in the month, had been allowed home after
a ``personnel dependability and debriefing session.'' It said two
others, Mohammad Farooq, and another identified only as Saeed, were
``still undergoing debriefing.''

Opposition politicians have condemned the investigations as a
``national insult'' and a capitulation to American pressure.

It was inevitable the spotlight of the Iran probe would turn to Khan,
who worked in the 1970s at a uranium enrichment plant run by
British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco.

According to diplomats close to the Vienna-based IAEA, the centrifuge
designs used by Iran were of a machine made by the plant in the
Netherlands.

In 1983, after his return to Pakistan, Khan was sentenced in absentia
to four years' jail by an Amsterdam court for attempted espionage, a
decision later overturned on appeal.

Earlier this year, Washington announced commercial sanctions on Khan
Research Laboratories for allegedly arranging the transfer of
nuclear-capable missiles from North Korea to Pakistan, a decision
Islamabad protested.
================================================================================
nkdatta8839
2003-12-23 18:35:18 UTC
Permalink
www.latimes.com

Los Angeles Times
January 5, 2003

The Evil Behind the Axis?
By Maggie Farley and Bob Drogin, Times Staff Writers

[A scientist who built Pakistan's nuclear bomb may have helped North
Korea, Iraq and Iran. The national hero denies he's 'a madman.']

UNITED NATIONS -- If one man sits at the nuclear fulcrum of the three
countries President Bush calls the "axis of evil," it may well be
Abdul Qadeer Khan.

The 66-year-old metallurgist is considered the father of Pakistan's
nuclear bomb. He is a national hero at home, where hospitals bear his
name and children sing his praises. U.S. and other Western officials
do not. They say Khan is the only scientist known to be linked to the
alleged efforts of North Korea, Iraq and Iran to develop nuclear
weapons.

"If the international community had a proliferation most-wanted list,
A. Q. Khan would be most wanted on the list," said Robert J. Einhorn,
who was assistant secretary of State for nonproliferation in the
Clinton administration.

U.S. intelligence long has known of Khan's activities. But the extent
of his ties to all three "axis" nations became public only recently as
North Korea admitted resuming its nuclear weapons effort, satellite
photos showed that Iran may be conducting clandestine nuclear work and
Khan's name appeared in a letter offering to "manufacture a nuclear
weapon" for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Pakistan denies giving nuclear assistance to other countries and
insists that Khan has done no wrong. But under intense U.S. pressure,
President Pervez Musharraf abruptly removed Khan as head of nuclear
weapons development two years ago. Bush administration officials, wary
of undermining a partner in the U.S.-declared war on terrorism,
publicly downplay concerns about Islamabad's possible role in
spreading nuclear knowledge.

Privately, U.S. officials have confronted Pakistani leaders in recent
years with the suggestion that Islamabad might not have complete
control over its nuclear scientists. However, some analysts and
experts doubt that a maverick scientist working alone -- even one as
senior as Khan -- could have engineered such sensitive deals with so
many governments.

"We know he's been [to North Korea] at least 13 times, perhaps more,"
Gaurav Kampani, a nuclear expert at the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in
California, said of Khan. "It's obviously been sanctioned by
institutions within the Pakistani government."

Khan, with graying wavy hair and a salt-and-pepper mustache, has
shrugged off charges that he is a nuclear Johnny Appleseed. Instead,
he portrays himself as a scientist, a patriot -- and a pacifist.

"Some people have the impression that because I built a nuclear bomb,
I'm some sort of cruel person," he told a Pakistani journalist in
2001. "That's not the case. I built a weapon of peace, which seems
hard to understand until you realize Pakistan's nuclear capability is
a deterrent to aggressors. There has not been a war in the last 30
years, and I don't expect one in the future. The stakes are too high."

Unlike two other senior Pakistani nuclear scientists who were
questioned by U.S. and Pakistani authorities in 2001 after meetings
with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, Khan is not an Islamic radical.

"He is not a fundamentalist, though he is nationalist -- and sometimes
nationalism and religion get mixed up in Pakistan," said Pervez
Hoodbhoy, an anti-nuclear activist and MIT-trained physicist who
teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan's capital.
"He has been in it for the power, the money and the glory."

Khan has received all three. When he ran Pakistan's bomb-building
program, he reported directly to the nation's leader and had
free-flowing funds at his disposal. U.S. officials say Khan owns
several palatial residences. And he is revered not only at home, where
he is hailed for putting Pakistan on an equal nuclear footing with
rival India, but also in much of the Muslim world, where he is
lionized as the man who built the "Islamic bomb."

One-Upmanship Begins

It began when India tested a nuclear device in 1974 and Pakistan
immediately sought to catch up. Khan kick-started the country's
nuclear program the following year, allegedly providing copied plans
for gas centrifuges from the Urenco uranium enrichment facility in the
Netherlands, where he had worked. He also obtained a list of suppliers
that would prove invaluable. Khan ultimately was tried for treason in
absentia in the Netherlands, but the case was dropped when prosecutors
failed to properly deliver a summons.

"He stole the blueprints," said David Kay, who headed nuclear weapons
evaluation programs at the International Atomic Energy Agency in
Vienna from 1982 to 1992. "But he's not a cat burglar who snatched
some plans. He's a very good scientist."

Khan took charge of Pakistan's uranium enrichment program in 1976.
Using the Urenco designs, his team secretly built gas centrifuges at
the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories in Kahuta, a heavily guarded
complex near Islamabad. A separate agency, Pakistan's Atomic Energy
Organization, built the weapons using what U.S. officials believe were
plans obtained from China.

Pakistan detonated its first nuclear devices underground in May 1998,
shortly after India launched a second series of nuclear tests. But
U.S. officials say Pakistan had produced its first nuclear weapon a
decade earlier, thanks to Khan's success at the hardest part of
bomb-building: producing fissile material. Islamabad today is believed
to have 30 to 60 nuclear weapons.

Khan has proudly recounted how his team procured key components openly
from Western companies that were willing to help -- and by subterfuge
when they weren't. Khan said in an interview with Pakistan's Defense
Journal that Western governments tried to prevent his nation from
developing nuclear weapons but were foiled by the greed of their own
companies.

"Many suppliers approached us with the details of the machinery and
with figures and numbers of instruments and materials," he said. "They
begged us to purchase their goods."

For other items, the team used offshore front companies in nations
such as Japan and Singapore, sometimes routing the goods through
Jordan.

"I am not a madman or a nut," Khan told an interviewer in 2001. "If
making nuclear weapons for the sole purpose of safeguarding the
existence, independence and sovereignty of your country could be
termed madness or fanaticism, there are many thousands in other
countries who should be awarded even bigger titles. I am proud of my
work for my country. It has given Pakistanis a sense of pride,
security, and has been a great scientific achievement."

But international officials worry that Pakistan, through Khan, has
spread that nuclear knowledge to other countries. The strongest
evidence appears in North Korea.

U.S. officials say Khan initiated talks with the North Koreans in 1992
to obtain 10 to 12 medium-range Nodong ballistic missiles to help
Pakistan boost its military profile against India. The Americans say
the deal was finalized during a secret 1993 visit to North Korea by
Benazir Bhutto, then Pakistan's prime minister.

In April 1998, Pakistan test-fired a knockoff Nodong missile renamed
the Ghauri I, which can carry a nuclear payload deep into India. A
month later, North Koreans attended Pakistan's first nuclear tests,
according to European diplomats.

In exchange for the missiles, U.S. and other officials say, Pakistan
gave North Korea designs for Khan's gas centrifuges and other
assistance needed to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. After a tense
diplomatic standoff with the Clinton administration, North Korea
promised to freeze its nuclear program in 1994. It recently admitted
that it has a uranium enrichment program, however, and it has reopened
nuclear facilities that were closed under the 1994 agreement. Khan has
also played a notable role in Iran's nuclear development.

In 1986, Pakistan and Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement
after Khan visited Bushehr, a nuclear power plant that Tehran is
building with Russian help. After subsequent visits by Khan, Western
intelligence reported that Iranian scientists received training in
Pakistan in 1988 and that Pakistan was helping Iran build a nuclear
reactor in 1990. The exchanges seemed to cease by 1993 when Pakistan
and Iran became rivals over Afghanistan, said Ibrahim Marashi, a
proliferation expert at the Monterey Institute.

Because Iran has abundant oil and other energy sources, U.S. officials
long have suspected that Bushehr is a cover for a nuclear weapons
program. Concerns increased last month when satellite photos showed
construction at two other Iranian facilities, Arak and Natanz, that
Iranian dissidents contend are being used for nuclear weapons
development. Iran insists that its nuclear programs are for peaceful
purposes only.

Khan's role with Iraq is less clear. In October 1990, two months after
Iraq invaded Kuwait, an intermediary claiming to represent Khan met
agents from Baghdad's secret service. A memo dated Oct. 6, 1990, from
Section B-15 of Iraqi intelligence to Section S-15 of the Nuclear
Weapons Directorate describes "a proposal from Pakistani scientist
Abd-el Qadeer Khan" to help Iraq "establish a project to enrich
uranium and manufacture a nuclear weapon."

The middleman said Khan "was prepared to give us project designs for
nuclear bombs," according to the memo. The middleman said he was based
in Greece and would oversee shipments from Western Europe, using a
company he claimed to own in the Persian Gulf emirate of Dubai,
according to sources who have studied the memo.

U.N. weapons inspectors found the memo in 1995 in a cache of documents
hidden at a chicken farm near Baghdad. They determined that Iraq had
rejected the middleman's offer, but Iraq refused to identify him.

A letter from the International Atomic Energy Agency to U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1997 details interviews with agents
from Mukhabarat, Baghdad's secret service, who described Iraq's
clandestine nuclear program, code-named the Petrochemical-3 project.
The agents said that "PC-3 had adopted a policy of avoiding foreign
assistance, believing that the risk of exposure (e.g. through 'sting'
operations) far outweighed the likely technical benefits."

In 1998, Pakistan's government investigated the middleman's letter at
the IAEA's request and declared the offer a fraud. The nuclear agency
concluded that charges of Pakistani proliferation were "inconsistent
with the information available," but it listed the memo as a key
unresolved issue in a 1999 U.N. report on Iraq's arms programs. Iraq's
recent 12,000-page arms declaration referred twice to the "unsolicited
offer."

"The memo was taken quite seriously," said David Albright, president
of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington
and a former nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq. "There's this pattern
of leakage out of Pakistan. These people broke almost every country's
law to get their own nuclear components."

Nuclear Chief's Ouster

In March 2001, Musharraf removed Khan as head of Pakistan's nuclear
programs and named him a presidential advisor -- a move that nation's
nuclear hero heard about on television and at first refused to accept.

However, U.S. officials suspected that the exchanges with other
nations continued, especially after U.S. spy satellites spotted
Pakistani military cargo planes picking up missile parts in North
Korea last July. The North told U.S. officials that the parts were for
surface-to-air missiles, not for a missile that could deliver a
nuclear weapon.

In June 2001, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage all but
named Khan when he expressed concern that "people who were employed by
the nuclear agency and have retired" might be spreading nuclear
technology to North Korea.

After North Korea confessed last fall that it had resumed its nuclear
weapons program, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell again confronted
Pakistan's president about illegal assistance.

"Musharraf assured me, as he has previously, that Pakistan is not
doing anything of that nature," Powell said, though he noted that they
did not speak of Pakistan's past contacts with North Korea. "The past
is the past. I am more concerned about what is going on now. We have a
new relationship with Pakistan."

However, a senior U.S. official says the Bush administration keeps a
wary eye on the retired scientist as he oversees philanthropic groups,
runs seminars and feeds stray animals in his neighborhood.

"How can you stop the transfer of intellectual property?" the official
said. "The potential for sharing is always there."
nkdatta8839
2003-12-23 21:04:10 UTC
Permalink
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/23/opinion/23TUE1.html

NY Times
December 23, 2003

EDITORIAL

Pakistan's Nuclear Commerce

The United States has again been given good reason to wonder whether
Pakistan is the trustworthy ally it claims to be. Fresh evidence
indicates that it has sold nuclear-weapons secrets to Iran, North
Korea and perhaps other countries over the years. Pakistan's military
ruler, , insists that he stopped such sales after seizing power four
years ago. Yet just last year, American spy satellites detected a
Pakistani plane picking up North Korean missile parts thought to be
part of a swap for Pakistani nuclear technology. The Bush
administration must demand stronger controls over Pakistan's nuclear
labs, which seem to have been central to the transfers.

General Musharraf, who narrowly escaped assassination last week, is a
key to American policy in south-central Asia. The general supported
America's war in Afghanistan and has helped arrest Al Qaeda fugitives
in Pakistan. Yet it is not clear how fully he shares American
objectives on fighting nuclear proliferation and international
terrorism.

During the 1980's and 90's, Pakistan, although closely allied with
Washington, was virtually a rogue state. It shared nuclear bomb
technology with Iran and North Korea, sponsored terrorism in
Indian-ruled Kashmir and backed the Taliban government that sheltered
Osama bin Laden. General Musharraf has changed some of these policies.
But Washington must pressure him to do more.

The latest evidence on nuclear exports came to light when Iran
recently shared with international regulators information about its
nuclear suppliers. Earlier this year, international inspectors found
uranium enrichment centrifuges in Iran that were identical to early
Pakistani designs. The technology trail points to Pakistan's A. Q.
Khan Research Laboratories, and several of its leading scientists have
now been questioned. Three years ago, at Washington's urging, General
Musharraf removed Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's own
nuclear weapons program, as the laboratories' director. It is possible
that nuclear technology exports continued, as the intercepted North
Korean missile shipment suggests. The laboratories have allies in
Pakistan's army and its powerful military intelligence agency. To
ensure that nuclear exports are truly halted, General Musharraf must
tighten government control over the laboratories.

Washington should demand changes in other policies as well. General
Musharraf's undermining of mainstream opposition parties has helped
strengthen the Islamic parties that now rule areas along the Afghan
border where Taliban recruiters openly operate. Containing Islamic
extremism in Pakistan requires allowing mainstream opposition parties
to function freely.

General Musharraf is again pledging to stop terrorists crossing into
Indian-controlled Kashmir. Such vows are easily made in December, when
infiltration routes are blocked with snow. An effective crackdown
requires reining in army leaders who use the Kashmir issue to win
higher military budgets than Pakistan can afford and local commanders
who wink at border-crossing militants.

The Bush administration, which sees General Musharraf as a valuable
ally against terrorism, has not pressured him to restore democracy.
Betting American security on one man in a troubled country of 150
million is risky. A wiser course would be to hold General Musharraf to
all of his promises, on nuclear exports, terrorist infiltration and
restoring democracy.
nkdatta8839
2003-12-26 04:09:30 UTC
Permalink
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3343621.stm

BBC News
Tuesday, 23 December, 2003, 14:00 GMT

Profile: Abdul Qadeer Khan

Abdul Qadeer Khan, who has been questioned in Pakistan over possible
transfers of nuclear technology to Iran, is regarded as a national
hero for helping his country become a nuclear state.

Dr Khan played the key role in developing Pakistan's nuclear military
capability, which culminated in successful tests in May 1998.
Coming shortly after similar tests by India, Dr Khan's work helped
seal Pakistan's place as the world's seventh nuclear power and sparked
national jubilation.

In March 2001 he was promoted to the inner circle of the country's
military leadership as special science and technology adviser to
President Pervez Musharraf.

European studies

Abdul Qadeer Khan was born into a modest family in Bhopal, India, in
1935.
I never had any doubts I was building a bomb. We had to do it
Abdul Qadeer Khan He migrated to Pakistan in 1952, following the
country's partition from India five years earlier.

He graduated from the University of Karachi before moving to Europe
for further studies in West Germany and Belgium.

In the 1970s, he took a job at a uranium enrichment plant run by the
British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco.

But in 1976, Dr Khan returned home to head up the nation's nuclear
programme with the support of then prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Khan's Kahuta plant is Pakistan's main nuclear weapons
laboratoryDuring his work, Dr Khan insisted that the programme had no
military purpose, but following the 1998 tests admitted: "I never had
any doubts I was building a bomb. We had to do it."

He went on to work on the successful test-firings of the
nuclear-capable Ghauri I and II missiles.

As he was carrying out his programme, Dr Khan was also being
investigated in the Netherlands for taking enrichment technology
during his time in the country.
In 1983, he was sentenced in absentia to four years in prison by an
Amsterdam court for attempted espionage, although the sentence was
later overturned on appeal.

US sanctions

Dr Khan's facility, Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta, became
Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory where uranium was enriched.
It has continued to attract US suspicion and this year Washington
imposed sanctions on the firm for the alleged transfer of missile
technology from North Korea.

Nevertheless, Dr Khan's standing in Pakistan is so high as the father
of the nation's atomic bomb that his questioning in the current probe
has been described merely as a "routine debriefing".

Despite media claims to the contrary, the government says he has faced
no restrictions on his movement.

In later years, Dr Khan has launched a campaign against illiteracy and
built educational institutes in Mianwali and Karachi.

He recently told yes.pakistan.com: "I am proud of my work for my
country. It has given Pakistanis a sense of pride, security and has
been a great scientific achievement."
nkdatta8839
2003-12-26 04:11:06 UTC
Permalink
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3343621.stm

BBC News
Tuesday, 23 December, 2003, 14:00 GMT

Profile: Abdul Qadeer Khan

Abdul Qadeer Khan, who has been questioned in Pakistan over possible
transfers of nuclear technology to Iran, is regarded as a national
hero for helping his country become a nuclear state.

Dr Khan played the key role in developing Pakistan's nuclear military
capability, which culminated in successful tests in May 1998.
Coming shortly after similar tests by India, Dr Khan's work helped
seal Pakistan's place as the world's seventh nuclear power and sparked
national jubilation.

In March 2001 he was promoted to the inner circle of the country's
military leadership as special science and technology adviser to
President Pervez Musharraf.

European studies

Abdul Qadeer Khan was born into a modest family in Bhopal, India, in
1935. He migrated to Pakistan in 1952, following the country's
partition from India five years earlier.

He graduated from the University of Karachi before moving to Europe
for further studies in West Germany and Belgium.

In the 1970s, he took a job at a uranium enrichment plant run by the
British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco.

But in 1976, Dr Khan returned home to head up the nation's nuclear
programme with the support of then prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Khan's Kahuta plant is Pakistan's main nuclear weapons
laboratoryDuring his work, Dr Khan insisted that the programme had no
military purpose, but following the 1998 tests admitted: "I never had
any doubts I was building a bomb. We had to do it."

He went on to work on the successful test-firings of the
nuclear-capable Ghauri I and II missiles.

As he was carrying out his programme, Dr Khan was also being
investigated in the Netherlands for taking enrichment technology
during his time in the country.
In 1983, he was sentenced in absentia to four years in prison by an
Amsterdam court for attempted espionage, although the sentence was
later overturned on appeal.

US sanctions

Dr Khan's facility, Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta, became
Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory where uranium was enriched.
It has continued to attract US suspicion and this year Washington
imposed sanctions on the firm for the alleged transfer of missile
technology from North Korea.

Nevertheless, Dr Khan's standing in Pakistan is so high as the father
of the nation's atomic bomb that his questioning in the current probe
has been described merely as a "routine debriefing".

Despite media claims to the contrary, the government says he has faced
no restrictions on his movement.

In later years, Dr Khan has launched a campaign against illiteracy and
built educational institutes in Mianwali and Karachi.

He recently told yes.pakistan.com: "I am proud of my work for my
country. It has given Pakistanis a sense of pride, security and has
been a great scientific achievement."
nkdatta8839
2004-01-07 03:10:50 UTC
Permalink
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/04/international/04NUKE.html

The New York Times
January 4, 2004

From Rogue Nuclear Programs, Web of Trails Leads to Pakistan

By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD

The Pakistani leaders who denied for years that scientists at the country's
secret A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories were peddling advanced nuclear
technology must have been averting their eyes from a most conspicuous piece of
evidence: the laboratory's own sales brochure, quietly circulated to aspiring
nuclear weapons states and a network of nuclear middlemen around the world.

The cover bears an official-looking seal that says "Government of Pakistan" and
a photograph of the father of the Pakistani bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan. It
promotes components that were spinoffs from Pakistan's three-decade-long
project to build a nuclear stockpile of enriched uranium, set in a drawing that
bears a striking resemblance to a mushroom cloud.

In other nations, such sales would be strictly controlled. But Pakistan has
always played by its own rules.

As investigators unravel the mysteries of the North Korean, Iranian and now the
Libyan nuclear projects, Pakistan — and those it empowered with knowledge and
technology they are now selling on their own — has emerged as the
intellectual and trading hub of a loose network of hidden nuclear
proliferators.

That network is global, stretching from Germany to Dubai and from China to
South Asia, and involves many middlemen and suppliers. But what is striking
about a string of recent disclosures, experts say, is how many roads appear
ultimately to lead back to the Khan Research Laboratories in Kahuta, where
Pakistan's own bomb was developed.

In 2002 the United States was surprised to discover how North Korea had turned
to the Khan laboratory for an alternative way to manufacture nuclear fuel,
after the reactors and reprocessing facilities it had relied on for years were
"frozen" under a now shattered agreement with the Clinton administration. Last
year, international inspectors and Western intelligence agencies were surprised
again, this time by the central role Pakistan played in the initial technology
that enabled Iran to pursue a secret uranium enrichment program for 18 years.

The sources of Libya's enrichment program are still under investigation, but
those who have had an early glance say they see "interconnections" with both
Pakistan and Iran's programs — and Libyan financial support for the Pakistani
program that stretches back three decades.

Until two weeks ago, Pakistani officials had long denied that any nuclear
technology was transferred from their laboratories. But now that story has
begun to change, after the Pakistani authorities, under pressure, began
interrogating scientists from the laboratory about their assistance to other
nuclear aspirants. Two weeks ago, Dr. Khan himself was called in for what
appears to have been a respectful, and still inconclusive, questioning.

Responding to requests relayed through associates, Dr. Khan has recently denied
that he aided atomic hopefuls. But American and European officials note that in
the 1980's he repeatedly denied that Pakistan was at work on an atomic bomb,
which it finally tested in 1998.

While American intelligence officials have gathered details on the activities
of the creator of the Pakistani bomb and his compatriots for decades, four
successive American presidents have dealt with the issue extremely delicately,
turning modest sanctions against Pakistan on and off, for fear of destabilizing
the country when it was needed to counter the Soviets in the 1980's, much as it
is needed to battle terrorism today.

President Bush, who regularly talks about nuclear dangers, has never mentioned
Pakistan's laboratories or their proliferation in public — probably out of
concern of destabilizing President Pervez Musharraf, who has survived two
assassination attempts in December.

"He's been a stand-up guy when it comes to dealing with the terrorists," Mr.
Bush said of General Musharraf on Thursday. "We are making progress against Al
Qaeda because of his cooperation." He dismissed a question about the
vulnerability of Pakistan's own nuclear weapons, saying, "Yes, they are
secure," then changed the subject.

Yet when President Bush talks about the horrors that could unfold if a nuclear
weapon fell into the hands of terrorists, it is Pakistan's combustible mix of
expertise, components, fuel and fully assembled weapons that springs to the
minds of American and European intelligence experts. In public, the White House
says it has received "assurances" from Pakistan that if there ever were nuclear
exports they are finished.

"There is this almost empty-headed recitation of assurances that whatever
Pakistan did in the past it's over, it's no longer a problem," said one senior
European diplomat with access to much of the intelligence about proliferation.
"But there's is no evidence that it has ever stopped."

Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the United Nations organization charged with monitoring nuclear energy
worldwide, contends that the recent nuclear disclosures show that the system
put in place at the height of the cold war to contain nuclear weapons
technology has ruptured and can no longer control the new nuclear trade.

"The information is now all over the place, and that's what makes it more
dangerous than in the 1960's," Dr. ElBaradei said.

The Crucial Ingredient

The biggest hurdle in making a nuclear weapon is not designing the warhead, but
getting the right fuel to create an atomic explosion. One route is to extract
plutonium from nuclear reactors and reprocess it to produce more fuel, known as
creating a fuel cycle. The other is to extract uranium from the ground and
enrich it.

The 1970 treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons was devised to
control which countries could possess and pursue nuclear arms. It allowed the
United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China to keep all their
weapons but required all other signatories to forswear nuclear arms. North
Korea, Iran and Libya all signed, allowing I.A.E.A. inspectors limited visits
to verify that countries producing nuclear fuel were truly using "atoms for
peace." Pakistan and India never signed, nor did Israel.

Aside from inspections, spy satellites and airborne "sniffers" can usually pick
out the huge complexes needed to extract spent fuel from nuclear reactors and
turn it into bomb fuel. But after North Korea was caught cheating by the United
States in the early 1990's and was forced into an agreement to "freeze" its
reactor-and-reprocessing complex at Yongbyon, the lesson was clear: to produce
bomb fuel, countries needed to take a more surreptitious route.

Uranium enrichment was the most promising, because it could take place in
hidden facilities, emitting few traces. And that was the technology that Dr.
Khan perfected as his laboratory raced to produce a nuclear bomb to keep up
with its rival, India.

The key to the technology is the development of centrifuges. These hollow tubes
spin fast to separate a gaseous form of natural uranium into U-238, a heavy
isotope, and U-235, a light one. The rare U-235 isotope is the holy grail: it
can easily split in two, releasing bursts of nuclear energy.

But making centrifuges is no easy trick. The rotors of centrifuges, spinning at
the speed of sound or faster, must be very strong and perfectly balanced or
they fly apart catastrophically.

To produce bomb-grade fuel, uranium must pass through hundreds or thousands of
centrifuges linked in a cascade, until impurities are spun away and what
remains is mainly U-235 . The result is known as highly enriched uranium.

Dr. Khan returned to Pakistan in 1976 after working in the Netherlands,
carrying extremely secret centrifuge designs — a Dutch one that featured an
aluminum rotor, and a German one made of maraging steel, a superhard alloy. He
was charged with stealing the designs from a European consortium where he
worked.

"The designs for the machines," said a secret State Department memo at the
time, "were stolen by a Pakistani national."

The steel rotor in the German design turned out to be particularly difficult to
make, but it could spin twice as fast, meaning it produced more fuel.

Dr. Khan's accomplishments turned him into a national hero. In 1981, as a
tribute, the president of Pakistan, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, renamed the
enrichment plant the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories.

Dr. Khan, a fervent nationalist, has condemned the system that limits legal
nuclear knowledge to the five major nuclear powers, or that has ignored
Israel's nuclear weapon while focusing on the fear of an Islamic bomb. "All
Western countries," he was once quoted as saying, "are not only the enemies of
Pakistan but in fact of Islam."

In the years before Pakistan's first test in 1998, Dr. Khan and his team began
publishing papers in the global scientific literature on how to make and test
its uranium centrifuges. In the West, these publications would have been
classified secret or top secret.

But Dr. Khan made no secret of his motive: he boasted in print of circumventing
the restrictions of the Western nuclear powers, declaring in a 1987 paper that
he sought to pierce "the clouds of the so-called secrecy." Papers in 1987 and
1988 detailed how to take the next, difficult steps in the construction of
centrifuges — reaching beyond first-generation aluminum rotors to produce
more efficient centrifuges out of maraging steel.

David Albright, a former weapons inspector for the I.A.E.A, said the American
intelligence community viewed Dr. Khan's papers as a boast. They proved that
Pakistan "knew how to build the G-2," a particularly complex design of German
origin.

A 1991 paper by his colleagues at the laboratory gave more details away,
revealing how to etch special grooves on a centrifuge's bottom bearing, a
crucial part for aiding the flow of lubricants in machines spinning at
blindingly fast speeds.

A Pentagon program that tracks foreign scientific publications has uncovered
dozens of reports, scientific papers and conference proceedings on uranium
enrichment that Dr. Khan and his colleagues published. While federal and
private experts agree that the blitz left much confidential — including some
crucial dimensions, ingredients, manufacturing tricks and design secrets —
Pakistan was clearly proclaiming that it had mastered the black art.

"It was a signal to India and the West saying, `Look, we're not the backward
people you think we are,' " said Mark Gorwitz, a nonproliferation expert who
tracks the Pakistani literature.

The scientific papers were soon followed by sales brochures. Much of the gear
marketed by the Khan laborat ry was critical for anyone eager to make Dr.
Khan's kind of centrifuges. It included vacuum devices that attached to a
centrifuge casing and sucked out virtually all the air, reducing friction
around the spinning rotors.

In 2000, the Pakistani government ran its own advertisement announcing
procedures for commercial exports of many types of nuclear gear, including gas
centrifuges and their parts, according to a Congressional Research Service
report published in May. Many of the items, it noted, "would be useful in a
nuclear weapons program."

Former American intelligence and nonproliferation experts said the C.I.A. was
aware of some, but not all, of these activities, and began tracking scientists
at the Khan laboratory.

But at every turn, overt pressure was weighed against strategic interests. In
the 1980's, Washington viewed Pakistan as a critical ally in the covert war it
was waging against the Soviets in Afghanistan. By 1986, American intelligence
agencies concluded that Pakistan had succeeded in making weapon-grade uranium,
the sure sign that the centrifuges worked. But that same year, Mr. Reagan
announced an aid package to Pakistan of more than $4 billion.

The First Nuclear Deals

What American intelligence agencies apparently did not understand at the time
was the pace at which Dr. Khan's team was beginning to help other nations.

It started as a quid pro quo with an old patron: China. A declassified State
Department memo, obtained by the National Security Archive in Washington,
concluded that China, sometime after its first bomb tests in the mid-1960's,
had provided Pakistan technology for "fissile material production and possibly
also nuclear device design."

Years later, the flow reversed. Mr. Albright, who is the president of the
Institute for Science and International Security, an arms control group in
Washington, has concluded that China was an early recipient of Pakistan's
designs for centrifuges. China had used an antiquated, expensive process for
enriching uranium, and the technology Dr. Khan held promised a faster, cheaper,
more efficient path to bomb-making.

But that was just the start. Evidence uncovered in recent months shows that
around 1987 Pakistan struck a deal with Iran, which had tried unsuccessfully to
master enrichment technology on its own during its war with Iraq. The outlines
of the deal — pieced together from limited inspections and documents turned
over to the I.A.E.A. in October — show that a centrifuge of Pakistani design
finally solved Iran's technological problems. That deal was "a tremendous
boost," Mr. Albright and his colleague, Corey Hinderstein, said in a draft
report on the Iranian program. "The possession of detailed designs could allow
Iran to skip many difficult research steps," they added.

The Iranian documents turned over to the I.A.E.A. make no reference to Pakistan
itself; they only point to its signature technologies.

"We have middlemen and suspicions," said a Western diplomat with access to the
documents. "There is a Pakistani tie for sure, but we don't know the details."

Iran's program fooled the I.A.E.A., which caught no whiff of it during 18 years
of inspections. But Pakistan's role was also well hidden from American
intelligence agencies.

"We had some intelligence successes with Iran, we knew about some of their
enrichment efforts," said Gary Samore, who headed up nonproliferation efforts
in the Clinton administration's National Security Council. "What we didn't know
was the Pakistan connection — that was a surprise. And the extent of
Pakistan's ties was, in retrospect, the surprise of the 1990's."

The Iranians were hardly satisfied customers. They had gotten Pakistan's older
models and were forced to slog ahead slowly for two decades, foraging around
the world for parts, building experimental facilities involving a few hundred
centrifuges, but apparently failing to produce enough fissile material for a
bomb.

If the Iranians were the turtle, the North Koreans proved the hare. Around
1997, a decade after the Pakistani deal with Iran, Dr. Khan made inroads with
the government of Kim Jong Il, as it sought a way to make nuclear fuel away
from the Yongbyon plant and the prying eyes of American satellites. Dr. Khan
began traveling to North Korea, visiting 13 times, American intelligence
officials said.

During those visits, North Korea offered to exchange centrifuge technology for
North Korean missile technology, enabling Pakistan to extend the reach of its
nuclear weapons across India.

Again, American intelligence agencies missed many of the signals. They knew of
an experimental program, but it took evidence from South Korea to demonstrate
that North Korea was moving toward industrial-level production. Then in the
summer of 2001, American spy satellites spotted missile parts being loaded into
a Pakistani cargo plane near Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. The parts
were assumed to be the quid pro quo for the nuclear technology.

Last spring, a few months after the deal was revealed in The New York Times,
the State Department announced some sanctions against the Khan laboratory but
cited the illegal missile transactions. The State Department said it had
insufficient evidence to issue sanctions for a nuclear transfer, a move some
dissenting officials suspected was a concession to avoid embarrassing General
Musharraf, who had denied that any nuclear transfers ever occurred.

A Congressional report on the Pakistan-North Korea trade notes that over the
years "Pakistan has been sanctioned in what some observers deem, an `on again,
off again' fashion," mostly for importing technology for unconventional
weapons, and later for its 1998 nuclear tests. Those sanctions, which were also
issued against India, were waived shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, when the United States suddenly needed Pakistan's cooperation.

It is unclear whether the Pakistan-North Korea connection has been cut off. But
new evidence suggests that North Korea is still racing ahead. In April, a ship
carrying a large cargo of superstrong aluminum tubing was stopped in the Suez
Canal after the German authorities determined that it was destined for North
Korea. The precise size of the tubes, according to Western diplomats and
industry reports, suggested that they were intended for making the outer
casings of G-2 centrifuges, the kind whose rotors are made of steel, and that
Dr. Khan wrote about.

The C.I.A. estimates that by 2005, if unchecked, North Korea will begin
large-scale production of enriched uranium.

But so far, American intelligence agencies say they are uncertain where North
Korea's centrifuge operations are. On Friday, North Korea said it would allow a
delegation of American experts into the country this week.

Halting Nuclear Trades

Early in 2003, Mr. Bush established a coordinating group inside the White House
to oversee the interception of shipments of unconventional weapons around the
world. So far, Washington has drawn more than a dozen nations into a loose
posse to track and stop shipments, and Germany, Italy, Taiwan and Japan have
executed seizures.

But the first interceptions — and the trail of parts and agreements they
reveal — have only pointed to the mushrooming size of the secondary market in
parts.

Even more worrisome are the kinds of exchanges that do not move on ships and
planes, what Ashton B. Carter, who worked in the Clinton administration on
North Korean issues, calls "substantial technical cooperation among all members
of the brotherhood of rogues."

North Korean engineers have been sighted living in Iran, ostensibly to help the
country build medium- and long-range missiles. But the growing suspicion is
that the relationship has now expanded beyond missiles, and that the two
nations are warily dealing in the nuclear arena as well.

"We're debating the evidence," said one administration official.

The latest nuclear disclosures came after the United States spotted a
German-registered ship headed for Libya through the Suez Canal, with thousands
of parts for uranium centrifuges. The interception in October of that shipment,
American officials say, tipped the balance for the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar
el-Qaddafi, forcing him to agree in December to disclose and dismantle his own
nuclear program.

Inspectors are still investigating where Libya's components came from, focusing
on manufacturers in Europe and what Dr. ElBaradei calls "interconnections"
between the Libyan program and Iran's.

The intercepted shipment came from Dubai, a place of great importance in Dr.
Khan's secretive world. It was a Dubai middleman claiming to represent Dr. Khan
who in 1990, on the eve of the Persian Gulf war, offered Dr. Khan's aid to Iraq
in building an atom bomb. And it was a Dubai middleman whom Dr. Khan blamed for
supplying centrifuge parts to Iran, said a European confidante of Dr. Khan's
who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Ties between Libya and Pakistan go back years. In 1973, when Pakistan was just
starting its nuclear program, Libya signed a deal to help finance its atomic
efforts in exchange for knowledge about how to make nuclear fuel, said Leonard
S. Spector of the Monterey Institute of International Studies' Center for
Nonproliferation Studies. From 1978 to 1980, he added, Libya appears to have
supplied Pakistan with uranium ore. But Libya appears to have made much less
progress than the Iranians had.

Dr. ElBaradei estimates that 35 to 40 nations now have the knowledge to build
an atomic weapon. In place of the nonproliferation treaty, which he calls
obsolete, he proposes revising the world's system to place any facilities that
can manufacture fissile material under multinational control.

"Unless you are able to control the actual acquisition of weapon-usable
material, you are not able to control proliferation," he said in recent
interview. But Mr. Bush and the leaders of the other established nuclear states
are reluctant to renegotiate a stronger treaty because it will reopen the
question of why some states are permitted to hold nuclear weapons and others
are not.

For now the world is left watching a terrifying race — one that pits
scientists, middlemen and extremists against Western powers trying to
intercept, shipload by shipload, the technology as it spreads through the
clandestine network. Mr. Bush remains wary of cracking down on a fragile
Pakistan, for fear pressure could tip the situation toward the radicals.

Some in the administration say they think other nations may follow Libya's
calculations and abandon their programs voluntarily. But there are doubters.

"Its a fine theory," a top nonproliferation strategist in the administration
said recently. "The question for 2004 is whether the mullahs or Kim Jong Il buy
into it."
nkdatta8839
2004-01-10 01:29:39 UTC
Permalink
http://www.economist.com/World/asia/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2342448

Economist, UK
Jan 8th 2004

Pakistan's nuclear dealings
Rogues step in
Pursuing personal greed or state policy?

..... allegations by Bush administration officials and others that
Pakistan is the likely source of the uranium-enrichment technology
that Libya admitted last month was part of its clandestine effort to
build a bomb have been furiously denied by Pakistani spokesmen. Yet
the denials are not as confident as they once were: the new line is
that such transfers, if they have taken place, must be the work of a
few individuals motivated by "ambition or greed".

Putting the blame on rogue scientists rather than Pakistan as a rogue
proliferator hardly removes the doubts about the security of the
country's nuclear-weapons programme. The pattern of evidence comes as
no surprise to those who track the clandestine trade in weapons
technology and materials. In 2002 South Korean intelligence pointed to
Pakistan as the source of centrifuge technology for North Korea's
production of highly-enriched uranium, which like plutonium can form
the fissile core of a bomb. Last October Iran gave the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the names of individuals and companies
that had assisted its hitherto secret uranium-enrichment programme.
Some trails, it seems, lead back to Pakistan (but others to Russia,
China and companies in Europe).

Suspicion has long fallen on Pakistan's own nuclear-weapons
scientists. Several, including Abdul Qadeer Khan, the former head of
the laboratory that bears his name and that spearheaded development of
Pakistan's nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles, have
reportedly been "debriefed" in recent weeks as part of the Iran
investigation.

Mr Khan is a national hero, as the father of Pakistan's "Islamic
bomb". He was convicted in absentia in the Netherlands, then later
acquitted on a technicality, for stealing the centrifuge designs on
which Pakistan's uranium-enrichment programme was based from a company
where he worked in the mid-1970s. He has long denied any involvement
in nuclear trafficking, official or otherwise. Though General
Musharraf removed him from his eponymous laboratory in March 2001,
because of American concern about his wider nuclear activities, he
remains an adviser to Pakistan's prime minister.

Western proliferation-watchers believe Mr Khan initiated talks with
North Korea as early as 1992, on the first of many visits, in order to
get his hands on some of North Korea's Nodong missiles, whose range
extends to 1,500km (930 miles). Although Pakistan denies it, its
Ghauri missile, flight-tested in 1998, is reckoned to be a Nodong
knock-off. The deal is thought to have been sealed the following year
during a secret visit by Pakistan's prime minister of the day, Benazir
Bhutto, whose father had launched Pakistan's secret bid for a bomb in
the 1970s. Payment appears to have been in kind: North Korea received
its first uranium-enrichment help by 1997. There have been unconfirmed
reports that it has also received help in warhead design (Pakistan's
warheads fit Nodong-type missiles like a glove).

For its part, Iran has admitted that it first got help for its
uranium-enrichment programme in 1987, before Iran and Pakistan found
themselves backing opposing sides in the long years of fighting in
Afghanistan. The centrifuges it eventually showed to IAEA inspectors
last year resemble Pakistani designs. Both Iran and North Korea
therefore got uranium help before General Musharraf became first army
chief in 1998 (the army in Pakistan has close control of
nuclear-weapons development) and then president in a coup the next
year. A Khan lab brochure purportedly offering dual-use nuclear
equipment for sale has been in circulation for over a year but is
dismissed by Pakistan as a forgery.

But what to make of the Libyan connection? And are more surprises
looming?

Libya's uranium dabblings had accelerated in the past two years. Like
Iran's they have been partly routed through Dubai, where collaborators
at Mr Khan's old laboratory have long been suspected of operating a
front company. Iraq, too, said middlemen there offered it nuclear
expertise in 1990. Might other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, which
like Libya has helped finance Pakistan's nuclear programme for years,
Egypt, Syria or Algeria have shown an interest too?

Getting to the bottom of the Pakistan connection may not be easy.
General Musharraf is now America's ally in the global war on
terrorism. So far, America has taken him at his word that his
government is not now engaged in proliferation. Easier, it seems, to
blame the scientists.
nkdatta8839
2004-01-12 19:38:45 UTC
Permalink
Post by nkdatta8839
By REUTERS
Filed at 11:51 a.m. ET
Father of Pakistani Bomb Questioned Over Iran Link
ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's atom
bomb, is being questioned about reports of possible links between the
Pakistani and Iranian nuclear programs, the Pakistani government said
Monday.
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/opinion/la-op-wolfsthal11jan11,1,7608309.story

Los Angeles Times
January 11, 2004 E-mail story Print

PAKISTAN: Keeping a Nuke Peddler in Line
By Jon B. Wolfsthal

[Jon Wolfsthal is deputy director of the Non-Proliferation Program at
the Carnegie Endowment. He is co-author of "Deadly Arsenals: Tracking
Weapons of Mass Destruction."]

WASHINGTON — It's been a poorly kept secret for several years that
Pakistan helped develop nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea and
probably in Libya. For the United States, however, Pakistan's help in
the war on terror has been more important than its peddling of nuclear
technology to rogue states. As a result, Islamabad has felt no
significant U.S. pressure to impose tighter controls on Pakistani
nuclear experts, expertise or equipment. But as evidence of Pakistan's
role in nuclear proliferation mounts, that's no longer an acceptable
trade-off. A country that arrests terrorists one day and sells nuclear
technology the next is not contributing to greater U.S. security.

After Sept. 11, 2001, news reports revealed that two Pakistani
scientists had direct contacts with Osama bin Laden while he was
operating in Afghanistan. Investigators later alleged that Abdul
Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, had traveled
almost a dozen times to North Korea to help Pyongyang develop a
uranium-enrichment program. And International Atomic Energy Agency
officials reported that uranium-enrichment equipment inspected in Iran
was identical to that found in Pakistan. Now, Pakistani officials
confirm that several of the country's top nuclear experts are being
questioned for providing nuclear technologies to other countries. And
there is a growing possibility that Libya's nuclear program, which
Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi recently pledged to shut down, bears
Pakistan's nuclear signature.

The U.S. has had little success in convincing high-level Pakistani
officials to safeguard the country's nuclear materials and technology.
Last year, for example, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell raised the
issue with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, offering U.S.
assistance. The Pakistani response was the equivalent of: "Butt out,
we can handle our own affairs." Last month's announcement that the
Pakistani army was assuming control of the country's nuclear program
was strictly a public-relations move.

It's possible that the Pakistani scientists being questioned were
operating without government permission. But Pakistan had a heads-up
about such contacts from the U.S. two years ago, which should have
prompted authorities to be more vigilant about monitoring nuclear
personnel. It's also possible that Pakistani nuclear experts helped
Iran and North Korea as part of official policy. Pakistan received
intermediate-range missiles from North Korea, but it was never clear
how cash-strapped Islamabad could afford them. Similarly, cash and oil
from Iran may have been lures for Pakistan's nuclear technology.

Regardless of why its scientists peddled nuclear assistance, Pakistan
has a problem it cannot or will not control: It has become the world's
No. 1 nuclear proliferator.

Accordingly, some say that Pakistan should be sanctioned or treated as
a rogue state. It's unclear, however, that punishment — or the threat
of punishment — would stop Pakistan from selling nuclear technology or
compel it to monitor its nuclear facilities more closely. Instead, it
might increase economic pressures and destabilize Pakistan, reducing
even its nominal control over nuclear weapons and facilities.

There's a better course.

The U.S. should make clear at the presidential level that Pakistan's
past nuclear misconduct has damaged American security, and that to
ensure its partnership with Washington, Islamabad must satisfy U.S.
concerns about its nuclear program. This would have to include
acceptance of American assistance to establish a personnel-reliability
program, which would include use of background checks, polygraphs and
drug tests; to improve physical protection of nuclear weapons,
materials and equipment by deploying modern security systems; and to
adopt international standards on the protection of nuclear materials
at production and storage sites.

At the same time, Washington must emphasize that its top priority in
its relations with Pakistan is nuclear proliferators, not assistance
in the pursuit of Bin Laden and members of Al Qaeda. Concern is
already running high in Pakistan that the U.S., just as it did after
the Soviets had left Afghanistan, will cut its ties after Bin Laden is
captured. Making nuclear nonproliferation the goal might reduce this
fear because it would require the U.S. to work with Pakistan over the
long haul, including helping to reform its economy. Furthermore,
India's and Pakistan's agreement to talk peace could give Islamabad
more leeway to work with Washington to secure its arsenal.

The belief in Pakistan is that the U.S. cannot fight the war on terror
without its help. But the price for such cooperation cannot be
Pakistan's continuing complicity in spreading nuclear technology to
rogue states. That price is simply too high.

Washington has promised a brighter future for Kadafi because he has
abandoned his nuclear ambitions. It should do the same for Pakistan as
long as Islamabad acts responsibly and stops selling its nuclear
knowledge to the highest bidders.
================================================================================
http://www.economist.com/World/asia/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2342448

Economist, UK
Jan 8th 2004

Pakistan's nuclear dealings
Rogues step in
Pursuing personal greed or state policy?

..... allegations by Bush administration officials and others that
Pakistan is the likely source of the uranium-enrichment technology
that Libya admitted last month was part of its clandestine effort to
build a bomb have been furiously denied by Pakistani spokesmen. Yet
the denials are not as confident as they once were: the new line is
that such transfers, if they have taken place, must be the work of a
few individuals motivated by "ambition or greed".

Putting the blame on rogue scientists rather than Pakistan as a rogue
proliferator hardly removes the doubts about the security of the
country's nuclear-weapons programme. The pattern of evidence comes as
no surprise to those who track the clandestine trade in weapons
technology and materials. In 2002 South Korean intelligence pointed to
Pakistan as the source of centrifuge technology for North Korea's
production of highly-enriched uranium, which like plutonium can form
the fissile core of a bomb. Last October Iran gave the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the names of individuals and companies
that had assisted its hitherto secret uranium-enrichment programme.
Some trails, it seems, lead back to Pakistan (but others to Russia,
China and companies in Europe).

Suspicion has long fallen on Pakistan's own nuclear-weapons
scientists. Several, including Abdul Qadeer Khan, the former head of
the laboratory that bears his name and that spearheaded development of
Pakistan's nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles, have
reportedly been "debriefed" in recent weeks as part of the Iran
investigation.

Mr Khan is a national hero, as the father of Pakistan's "Islamic
bomb". He was convicted in absentia in the Netherlands, then later
acquitted on a technicality, for stealing the centrifuge designs on
which Pakistan's uranium-enrichment programme was based from a company
where he worked in the mid-1970s. He has long denied any involvement
in nuclear trafficking, official or otherwise. Though General
Musharraf removed him from his eponymous laboratory in March 2001,
because of American concern about his wider nuclear activities, he
remains an adviser to Pakistan's prime minister.

Western proliferation-watchers believe Mr Khan initiated talks with
North Korea as early as 1992, on the first of many visits, in order to
get his hands on some of North Korea's Nodong missiles, whose range
extends to 1,500km (930 miles). Although Pakistan denies it, its
Ghauri missile, flight-tested in 1998, is reckoned to be a Nodong
knock-off. The deal is thought to have been sealed the following year
during a secret visit by Pakistan's prime minister of the day, Benazir
Bhutto, whose father had launched Pakistan's secret bid for a bomb in
the 1970s. Payment appears to have been in kind: North Korea received
its first uranium-enrichment help by 1997. There have been unconfirmed
reports that it has also received help in warhead design (Pakistan's
warheads fit Nodong-type missiles like a glove).

For its part, Iran has admitted that it first got help for its
uranium-enrichment programme in 1987, before Iran and Pakistan found
themselves backing opposing sides in the long years of fighting in
Afghanistan. The centrifuges it eventually showed to IAEA inspectors
last year resemble Pakistani designs. Both Iran and North Korea
therefore got uranium help before General Musharraf became first army
chief in 1998 (the army in Pakistan has close control of
nuclear-weapons development) and then president in a coup the next
year. A Khan lab brochure purportedly offering dual-use nuclear
equipment for sale has been in circulation for over a year but is
dismissed by Pakistan as a forgery.

But what to make of the Libyan connection? And are more surprises
looming?

Libya's uranium dabblings had accelerated in the past two years. Like
Iran's they have been partly routed through Dubai, where collaborators
at Mr Khan's old laboratory have long been suspected of operating a
front company. Iraq, too, said middlemen there offered it nuclear
expertise in 1990. Might other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, which
like Libya has helped finance Pakistan's nuclear programme for years,
Egypt, Syria or Algeria have shown an interest too?

Getting to the bottom of the Pakistan connection may not be easy.
General Musharraf is now America's ally in the global war on
terrorism. So far, America has taken him at his word that his
government is not now engaged in proliferation. Easier, it seems, to
blame the scientists.
================================================================================
Post by nkdatta8839
The move follows investigations by the U.N.'s nuclear agency. Tehran
has acknowledged using centrifuge designs that appear identical to
ones used in Islamabad's nuclear weapons program.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan told Reuters Khan was being
questioned in connection with the ``debriefings'' taking place of
several scientists working at his Khan Research Laboratories, a
uranium enrichment plant near Islamabad.
``He is too eminent a scientist to undergo a normal debriefing
session,'' Masood Khan said. ``However, some questions have been
raised with him in relation to the ongoing debriefing sessions.''
The spokesman denied reports that Khan was ``under restriction'' and
gave no other details.
Several intelligence sources told Reuters however the scientist, who
is a national hero for developing a nuclear bomb tested in 1998 to
rival India's, had not been allowed to receive visitors at his home in
Islamabad nor to leave it since last week.
One intelligence official said the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation had taken part in the questioning.
``It is a routine matter,'' said one of the sources, who did not want
to be identified. ``We are debriefing every nuclear scientist, so Dr
Qadeer is facing the same formality.''
Diplomats in Vienna told Reuters last month the U.N.'s International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was investigating whether blueprints for
Iran's centrifuge had come from someone in Pakistan or elsewhere.
Tehran, accused by Washington of trying to develop nuclear weapons,
told the IAEA it had got them from a ``middleman'' whose identity the
agency had not determined, a Western diplomat told Reuters at the
time.
KEY U.S. ALLY
Pakistan, a key U.S. ally in the ``war on terror,'' denies exporting
nuclear technology and specifically denies any link to Iran's nuclear
program.
Sunday, authorities said Yasin Chohan, one of three Khan Laboratories
scientists detained earlier in the month, had been allowed home after
a ``personnel dependability and debriefing session.'' It said two
others, Mohammad Farooq, and another identified only as Saeed, were
``still undergoing debriefing.''
Opposition politicians have condemned the investigations as a
``national insult'' and a capitulation to American pressure.
It was inevitable the spotlight of the Iran probe would turn to Khan,
who worked in the 1970s at a uranium enrichment plant run by
British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco.
According to diplomats close to the Vienna-based IAEA, the centrifuge
designs used by Iran were of a machine made by the plant in the
Netherlands.
In 1983, after his return to Pakistan, Khan was sentenced in absentia
to four years' jail by an Amsterdam court for attempted espionage, a
decision later overturned on appeal.
Earlier this year, Washington announced commercial sanctions on Khan
Research Laboratories for allegedly arranging the transfer of
nuclear-capable missiles from North Korea to Pakistan, a decision
Islamabad protested.
nkdatta8839
2004-01-14 01:22:50 UTC
Permalink
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101040119-574887,00.html

The Time
Monday, Jan. 12, 2004

Evidence mounts that Pakistani scientists sold nuclear know-how to a
triad of rogue nations
By JOHANNA MCGEARY

Dapper Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan was always a man with a
mission — even if it was long shrouded in obscurity. Some 30 years
ago, he allegedly stole blueprints for enriching uranium from the
top-secret Dutch lab where he worked. For decades, his team in
Pakistan labored behind heavily guarded walls to produce enough of the
fuel to make A-bombs. In 1998 he watched proudly as Pakistan detonated
its first nuclear devices beneath the scorched desert hills of
Baluchistan, shocking an unsuspecting world. A public hero at last to
exultant countrymen, he was hailed throughout the Muslim world as the
"father of the Islamic Bomb."

Now Khan is earning new renown as the godfather of nuclear
proliferation, a dangerous salesman who helped bring the Bomb within
closer reach of other eager powers. Since Iran and Libya were exposed
in recent months as nuclear-weapon owners in the making, Khan and more
than six other scientists who worked with him, plus an undisclosed
number of Pakistani diplomats and intelligence agents posted abroad,
have been under investigation in Islamabad for sharing the playbook of
atomic weapons with those states, well-placed foreign intelligence
sources tell TIME. Khan has long been suspected of orchestrating
Pakistan's nukes-for-missiles swap with North Korea, and his name even
appeared in a 1990 letter from a Dubai middleman to Saddam Hussein
offering to sell Iraq the scientist's nuclear know-how.

U.S. intelligence officers have joined the Pakistani probe, hoping it
will provide clues to unmask and stamp out clandestine
nuclear-procurement networks. The one Khan pioneered for Pakistan is
considered a model for would-be Bomb builders. "I've always thought
that A.Q. Khan's Rolodex is the most important thing of all in giving
people advice on how to put all the pieces together," says Robert
Oakley, former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan. Washington is worried that
someone might barter away Pakistan's nuclear secrets to terrorists.

One question no one involved wants to address is whether Khan and his
colleagues operated on their own or at the behest of the Pakistani
government. President Pervez Musharraf, who under pressure from
Washington sacked Khan as head of nuclear-weapons development in early
2001, insists that his four-year-old government has never dabbled in
nuclear trade — whatever past regimes might have done. It's possible
that Khan & Co. or the military and intelligence officers who long
supported such deals acted independently. "I think that during his
administration there was a lot going on," said Jay Rockefeller, the
top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, declining to give
details. Investigators in Islamabad tell TIME that a handful of
scientists now being interrogated were selling the nation's nuclear
secrets for their own profit or for ideological reasons. Those
investigators absolve the government and steer clear of fingering Khan
as the ringleader. Eager to keep Musharraf in power and a partner in
the war on terrorism, the Bush Administration also tiptoes around the
issue of Pakistan's official role. Yet some proliferation experts in
the U.S. doubt that rogue scientists and their cronies in the security
services could have arranged such supersecret, high-level deals
without government approval.

The possession of nuclear weapons haunts the subcontinent. The West
has long feared that religious extremism and the violent struggle for
dominance in the disputed territory of Kashmir could ignite a nuclear
conflict between Pakistan and India. In a welcome rollback of
tensions, the two countries pledged last week to work out half a
century of differences peacefully in negotiations beginning in
February.

Fear of far larger India started Pakistan on the pursuit of A-bombs in
the 1960s. The U.S. concluded then that Pakistan's old patron China,
also hostile to India, gave Islamabad crude technology for brewing
Bombs. But it was the young metallurgist Khan who initiated Pakistan's
crucial breakthrough when he went to work for Urenco, the Netherlands
consortium that perfected technology for enriching uranium to
Bomb-grade strength in gas centrifuges. After Khan went home to
Pakistan in 1976, Dutch authorities charged him with stealing the
centrifuge plans and tried him in absentia. Khan's conviction was
later overturned on a technicality.

Gas centrifuges indisputably formed the basis of Pakistan's nuclear
success. At the Kahuta enrichment facility, later renamed the A.Q.
Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), the scientist and his team mastered
the art of making Bomb fuel. Khan was especially clever at setting up
the secret supply network that Pakistan used through the 1980s and
'90s to circumvent global controls on sensitive parts and materials,
even as the government denied it was doing so. Using shell companies
based in the Middle East and willing or unwitting middlemen, Khan
managed to scavenge the necessary components from all over the U.S.,
Canada and Europe.

U.S. officials are convinced that Khan was the key player in the
barters that Pakistan made with North Korea. A 1994 agreement with the
U.S. froze work at Pyongyang's nuclear-fuel reprocessing plant. Three
years later, in exchange for the design of the centrifuges plus
components to enrich uranium, Pakistan obtained from North Korea
600mile-range, nuclear-capable Nodong missiles that Khan's lab
retooled and renamed the Ghauri. U.S. intelligence alleges he made a
dozen or so visits to Pyongyang over several years.

Iran may have been another client. Investigators from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who examined suspected
nuclear facilities in Iran late last year found signs of a Pakistan
connection. They uncovered evidence showing that when Iran's own
efforts to master enrichment failed in the late 1980s, Tehran acquired
Pakistani-style centrifuge technology, including parts and detailed
designs for machines remarkably similar to ones in KRL's workshops.
Western intelligence says Khan paid several clandestine visits to
Iran's Bushehr nuclear-power plant, though he denies it.

When mercurial Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi abruptly renounced his
nuclear ambitions at the end of December, he exposed another case of
Pakistani proliferation. Investigators now exploring Libya's projects
have found "interconnections" with Pakistan's technology and a
backdoor trading network, according to a New York Times report. The
U.S. thinks oil-rich Libya first began funding Pakistan's nuclear
development in the 1970s and periodically supplied raw uranium.
Washington officials say Gaddafi was eventually rewarded with
Pakistan's centrifuge designs and secret supplies of essential
materiel that helped Libya close in on nuclear-fuel production.

Khan is hardly the only Pakistani scientist to raise international
suspicion. Shortly after 9/11, two retired nuclear experts with ties
to Muslim extremists were questioned by the FBI about allegations that
they had discussed developing weapons with al-Qaeda. Islamabad's
current inquiry is focused on a group of Khan subordinates. The
investigators tell TIME that Khan acknowledges "authorizing" some of
their trips to Libya, Iran and North Korea but says he had "no idea"
whether they were conducting clandestine business on their own. But
Khan is widely regarded as the man with the knowledge and the
authority to make the big deals. He was in complete, unchallenged
control of KRL until 2001. A former colleague of his claims that Khan
could fly anywhere without permission, make any deal he wanted. The
tall, silver-haired scientist amassed a personal fortune that pays for
a lavish lifestyle. His position and revered status would earn plenty
of perks. But many, including U.S. intelligence officials, believe he
acquired those riches peddling his nuclear expertise.

In rare public statements, Khan has insisted he is a peaceful man
opposed to nuclear proliferation. (He denied TIME's requests for an
interview.) A former Musharraf aide says Khan's megaton ego — almost
as much as U.S. charges that he ran a nuclear bazaar — persuaded
Musharraf to force him into retirement. But Pakistani investigators
remain leery of squeezing the national hero too tightly. Khan is a
public icon, his hawkish face known to every schoolchild. Arresting
him could trigger dangerous protest among Islamist extremists and
senior military officers who feel Musharraf has already gone too far
in appeasing the White House. Khan's travel has been restricted, and
even inside Pakistan, he is always accompanied by two military
officers. He rarely leaves his Islamabad mansion except to venture out
to feed wild monkeys that swing down in the nearby forest. Officials
in Washington meanwhile cross their fingers that Musharraf can and
will make sure that with Khan sealed away, Pakistan's nuclear giveaway
is over.
nkdatta8839
2004-01-17 01:23:01 UTC
Permalink
http://www.dawn.com/weekly/mazdak/mazdak.htm

DAWN, Karachi, Pakistan
10 January 2004 Saturday 17 Ziqa'ad 1424

Out on a limb
By Irfan Husain

..... when Colonel Muammar Qadhafi's son, Saif al-Islam, declared in a
recent interview with the Sunday Times that Libya had bought nuclear
secrets from Pakistani scientists, the usual damage-control team swung
into action like a well-honed machine.

An official denial was issued, and several editorials and articles
appeared condemning this latest attempt to smear the fair name of
Pakistan. (In a convoluted denial datelined Islamabad, the young
Qadhafi is quoted as saying he meant the contacts were between 'Libyan
and Pakistani traders'. What kind of 'traders' are engaged in nuclear
secrets and how they came to acquire them is anybody's guess).

Just a couple of weeks ago, Iranian authorities had confirmed to IAEA,
the international nuclear arms control body, that they had bought
crucial centrifuge designs and components from Pakistani scientists.
And for years, reports have been circulating in the international
media that Pakistan has supplied North Korea with nuclear blueprints
and key parts in compensation for the help it has received for its
missile programme.

Taken together, this is a pretty damning set of charges against a
country that has long proclaimed that it was a responsible state, and
that it would not allow its nuclear secrets to fall into foreign
hands. But despite the seriousness of these accusations, there have
been curiously few questions asked of our rulers. We seem satisfied to
accept whatever spin our officials and our media have chosen to put on
the Pakistan connection with all these clandestine nuclear programmes.
.....

..... Currently, Pakistan's usefulness as an ally against Al Qaeda and
the Taliban is shielding it from the wrath of the Bush administration,
but this equation is a fleeting one: as the Afghan government is more
able to cope with the Taliban and its territory becomes less
hospitable to religious extremists, Pakistan will be seen both as the
centre of terrorist activity and the biggest nuclear proliferator
around.

There is (currently) no suggestion that all these illicit contacts had
the blessings of the government, or that President Musharraf had any
knowledge of them. However, if the ISI is the super-agency it's
cracked out to be, surely it must have kept track of the movements of
our top nuclear scientists. And if, as is now officially conceded,
some of these contacts were on a freelance basis, then large payments
must have been made and received.

A few months before the invasion of Iraq Saddam Hussein submitted a
10,000-page dossier to the UN containing a plethora of documents
pertaining to his weapons programmes. One of these was a memo from an
Iraqi undercover operative in which he reported that he had been
approached by a Pakistani who claimed he represented a top nuclear
scientist (currently being 'debriefed' in Islamabad) and offering to
sell Iraq nuclear blueprints. Although this report surfaced briefly in
the western media, not much was made of it at the time in the rush of
events. However, it should have been the starting point of a major
internal investigation by the Pakistan government.

But then, as now, the government and its relevant agencies went into
deep denial, refusing to face the obvious. It is clear that the Khan
Research Laboratories at Kahuta have been haemorrhaging secrets over
the years, but deliberately or not, our intelligence agencies have
turned a Nelson's eye to these dangerous activities. The result is
that we are caught with our hand in the cookie jar yet again. .....

..... The truth is that in the wake of the ferocious assault on Iraq,
a country demonstrably devoid of the WMDs, nations with nuclear
programmes to hide have started feeling very vulnerable and at risk.
Thus, Iran has accepted intrusive IAEA inspections, and Libya has
agreed to dismantle its weapons programme. And it seems that North
Korea will soon fall into line.

So where does this leave us? Way out on a limb. Given the current mood
that no longer brooks nuclear proliferation as well as the rapidly
improving prospects for peace in the Subcontinent, it is high time
that we reviewed the entire nuclear programme. .....
nkdatta8839
2004-01-20 19:58:09 UTC
Permalink
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_20-1-2004_pg3_1

Daily Times, Pakistan
Wednesday, January 21, 2004

EDITORIAL
Close the proliferation chapter

Investigations into charges that some scientists and auxiliary staff
at the Kahuta Research Laboratories might have leaked nuclear know-how
to third countries have netted five more personnel, including the
personal staff officer of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan who, along with four
others, was picked up for ‘debriefing' on January 18. But before we go
any further in this matter, it is important to recap the chronology of
events.

The first news about such an investigation came out in the second week
of December last year when intelligence agents picked up two KRL
scientists who worked on the team led by AQ Khan. The government had
tried to keep the whole affair hushed up, but was forced to
acknowledge that two scientists were indeed being interrogated after
the news came out and the opposition went to town on the issue. Then
on December 22, we were told that AQ Khan's movement had been
restricted. Just a day before that, a section of the domestic press
leaked the story about Pakistan's alleged hand in proliferating to
Iran. The very next day, the US newspaper The Washington Post carried
a long story on Pakistan's involvement with the Iranian programme. It
became clear at that point that someone in Islamabad chose to leak the
story to a national newspaper to reduce the impact of the Post story.
We say this because a few days before this story appeared, some
editors were briefed at the highest level and asked to be circumspect
on the issue. Incidentally, on the same day (December 23), a state
department spokesperson said the US government was satisfied with the
guarantees given it by Islamabad and the investigations the latter was
conducting into the whole affair.

Following this, on December 24, the Foreign Office spokesperson came
on-line and acknowledged officially that some scientists were being
interrogated and there were ‘signs of personal greed' in the whole
affair. In essence, he acknowledged that some personnel might have
jumped their brief and done things they were not supposed to do. This
statement flew in the face of earlier official statements denying that
any Pakistani organisation or personnel may have been involved in
leaking nuclear know-how to third parties. The same day, the
government briefed parliamentarians on the ongoing investigations.
Present at the briefing were the director-general of Strategic Plans
Division and the foreign secretary. The opposition parties in the
Alliance for Restoration of Democracy did not participate in the
briefing while some smaller parties were not invited to it.

The next day, on December 25, a former federal minister and a PML-N
leader Ishaq Dar told journalists that during Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif's first tenure, then-COAS Mirza Aslam Beg had come to Mr Sharif
and asked that Pakistan transfer nuclear technology to a ‘friendly'
country for $12 billion. Mr Dar said General Beg was accompanied by an
official of the ‘friendly' country. Mr Dar's statement implied that
such a transfer, if indeed it took place, was not possible without
some personnel in the army knowing about it. Mr Dar also said that
while it was important to investigate this issue, the scientists must
be allowed a fair defence.

On December 27, a wire agency reported that the IAEA (International
Atomic Energy Agency) report on Iran pointed to at least a half-dozen
countries that might have helped Iran move towards developing a
weapons capability. While this was going on, the British newspaper
Sunday Times quoted Libyan president Moammar Gadhafi's son,
Saif-ul-Islam, as alleging that Pakistan helped Libya with its nuclear
programme. The government denied it the next day. On January 8, the
official APP news service carried a retraction by Islam, which said
that he (Islam) had never named Pakistan in his interview with Sunday
Times.

Now we have five more people under interrogation. Meanwhile the
director-general of Inter-Services Public Relations has been quoted by
BBC as saying that no one is under arrest and these people are merely
being ‘debriefed'. This is of course a euphemism for interrogating the
people who are held. The initial official reaction to proliferation
charges, starting with North Korea which hit the news in October 2002,
was to deny it. But with the statement by the FO spokesperson, it
became clear that the smoke was caused by some fire. We believe that
the government needs to develop a credible response on this issue.
Some elements outside would like to drag this issue for obvious
reasons. Islamabad needs to quickly bring this to an end. If anyone is
found involved in this business, he or they, must be taken to task.
Simultaneously, Pakistan needs to put in place mechanisms that can
verifiably assure the world of its commitment to nonproliferation.

When Pakistan developed its own nuclear-weapons capability, it broke
the norm but did nothing illegal because like India and Israel it was,
and is, no signatory to any legal instrument. But breaking the norm
for one's own security is different than allegedly making space for
some personnel to go about helping others to develop the capability.
The state's inability to detect this kind of activity is inexcusable.
We would therefore want to see this whole chapter closed as soon as
possible.
n***@bigmailbox.net
2004-12-12 07:50:43 UTC
Permalink
[Musharraf denied "200%" that the Pakistani government or military knew
that Khan was making nuclear weapons information available to other
nations ..... Analysts have raised doubts about whether Musharraf is
keeping Khan from speaking to international investigators for fear the
scientist might reveal the extent to which some of his activities may
have been condoned by the Pakistani military]

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-musharraf6dec06,1,5584714.story?coll=la-headlines-world

LA Times
December 6, 2004

Musharraf Scorns Nuclear Probe
By Sonni Efron, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON - Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf on Sunday defended
his decision not to allow international investigators to interrogate
Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani scientist accused of peddling nuclear
secrets around the world.

Appearing on CNN's "Late Edition" on Sunday, Musharraf said the
requests from United Nations nuclear inspectors indicated a lack of
trust in Pakistan, portraying the issue as a matter of national pride.

President Bush met with Musharraf on Saturday and urged the Pakistani
military man to ensure that all information about the Khan network's
nuclear proliferation be turned over to the Americans. Musharraf
promised to do so.

But the White House did not ask for direct access to Khan -
apparently in deference to Pakistani sensitivities about a man who, as
the father of the country's atomic bomb, had been considered a hero.

However, the International Atomic Energy Agency still wants to
interview Khan, whom Musharraf has pardoned, and Khan's assistant, who
is held in Malaysia.

Lacking such cooperation, officials view it as unlikely that Khan's
activities will ever be fully unraveled, The Times reported Sunday.

Musharraf told CNN that Pakistan could do the best job interrogating
Khan.

"It shows a lack of trust in us," Musharraf said. "We can question him
the best, and then there is ... a domestic sensitivity. This man is a
hero for the Pakistanis, and there is a sensitivity that maybe the
world wants to intervene in our nuclear program, which nobody wants....
It is a pride of the nation."

Analysts have raised doubts about whether Musharraf is keeping Khan
from speaking to international investigators for fear the scientist
might reveal the extent to which some of his activities may have been
condoned by the Pakistani military.

Musharraf denied "200%" that the Pakistani government or military knew
that Khan was making nuclear weapons information available to other
nations.

The Pakistani leader, a key Bush administration ally in its war on
terrorism, also said that, in hindsight, the U.S. decision to invade
Iraq was a mistake.

"We have landed ourselves in more trouble," he said.

There was no new information on where Osama bin Laden could be,
Musharraf said, but he suggested that Al Qaeda's command structure in
Pakistan has been broken by recent military operations aimed at
rousting militants from tribal areas along the Afghan border.

In Pakistan, both pro-government and opposition parties staged large
street demonstrations coinciding with Musharraf's foreign tour.

In the central city of Multan, a coalition of six Islamic parties,
Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal, held a rally and vowed to force Musharraf to
quit as army chief if he reneged on his promise to do so voluntarily by
year's end, according to Reuters.

Loosening the military's control over politics has been a key goal of
the Pakistani democracy movement, but the parliament recently passed a
law that would allow Musharraf to keep the top army job as well as the
presidency.
======================================================
[Pakistan has disclosed to the United States the activities that Khan
engaged in without authorization from his handlers, Tellis said. "But
Musharraf for obvious institutional reasons has not come clean on the
Pakistani military's complicity in what A.Q. Khan was doing, and we
have not pushed him on that because it is a bridge too far."]

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-musharaf5dec05,1,937378.story

LA Times
December 6, 2004

..... A senior administration official, meanwhile, downplayed U.S.
frustration over the South Asian nation's refusal to allow Americans to
interrogate Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan about his nuclear
proliferation activities.

The White House also did not publicly mention the failure of Musharraf
and the U.S. to catch Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, nor did it chide
the Pakistani president for his decision to keep his post as army
chief, a move widely criticized as undermining democracy in Pakistan.
.....

Bush, sitting beside Musharraf in the Oval Office after their 55-minute
meeting, emphasized his commitment to help foster the creation of a
Palestinian state that would live in peace with Israel. Muslim leaders,
as well as British Prime Minister Tony Blair, have said progress on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is essential to defusing the anger that
helps fuel Islamic extremism.

Bush called for "a world effort to help the Palestinians develop a
state that is truly free: one that's got an independent judiciary; one
that's got a civil society; one that's got the capacity to fight off
the terrorists; one that allows for dissent; one in which people can
vote, and President Musharraf can play a big role in helping achieve
that objective."

Critics noted that most of those criteria were not met in Pakistan.

Musharraf seized power in a 1999 coup, purged the Supreme Court,
arbitrarily amended the constitution and has never stood for election
in a contested campaign, said Husain Haqqani, a former advisor to
Pakistani prime ministers who is now at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. .....

..... Pakistan has disclosed to the United States the activities that
Khan engaged in without authorization from his handlers, Tellis said.
"But Musharraf for obvious institutional reasons has not come clean on
the Pakistani military's complicity in what A.Q. Khan was doing, and we
have not pushed him on that because it is a bridge too far."
======================================================
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-scheer7dec07,1,2202089.column?coll=la-news-comment-opinions

LA Times
Tuesday, December 7, 2004

Pakistan and the True WMD Threat
By Robert Scheer

If it had been even a primitive nuclear weapon that hit the World Trade
Center three years ago, hundreds of thousands of people would have died
instead of fewer than 3,000, and the free society we enjoy almost
certainly would have been a casualty as well. In the shock of that
moment, the administration probably would have created a national
network of detention camps for suspected terrorists, and military
retaliation might have included the launch of nuclear missiles with the
capability of killing millions. All of which is exactly why it was so
terrifying to read in an investigative article in the Los Angeles Times
on Saturday that our "allies" in Pakistan, who have done so much to
spread nuclear weapons technology in recent years, are still capable of
doing so.

"Senior investigators said they were especially worried that dangerous
elements of the illicit network of manufacturers and suppliers would
remain undetected and capable of resuming operations once international
pressures eased," The Times reported. The article dissected the
inability of investigators worldwide to fully penetrate the illicit
nuclear weapons bazaar, which was run until last year by Pakistan's top
nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Khan is currently under the protection of Pakistan's military dictator,
President Pervez Musharraf, the same man who pardoned Khan and refuses
to allow foreign investigators to speak with him. Yet it was Musharraf
whom President Bush spent the weekend praising and accommodating.

As The Times article made clear, what "officials call the world's worst
case of nuclear proliferation" - in which sophisticated nuclear
technology was supplied to Libya, Iran and other rogue nations -
never would have been possible without the support of the Pakistani
military. This is the same complex and powerful organization that made
Pakistan a dictatorship in a 1999 coup by Musharraf. Yet within two
years of this coup, Bush dropped U.S. sanctions against Pakistan,
showing clear disregard for international nonproliferation restraints.
The rationale then and now was Pakistan's alleged support in the "war
on terrorism" after 9/11.

And despite the exposure of the Khan black market ring, nothing has
changed: In a White House meeting Friday, Bush honored Musharraf -
who since seizing power has purged his country's Supreme Court and
rewritten its constitution - as a "courageous leader."

The administration again hastened to explain that Musharraf was vital
in the three-year effort to capture Osama bin Laden "dead or alive," as
Bush frequently has proclaimed. How embarrassing then, when hours later
Musharraf conceded in a Washington Post interview that Bin Laden's
trail had grown completely cold but that the arch-terrorist is still
very much alive and functioning.

Musharraf complained that attempts to pin down Bin Laden and his Al
Qaeda operatives had been seriously undermined by what he politely
called "voids" in U.S. troop commitments to the area, which are equal
to a mere 15% of the U.S. forces in Iraq. The U.S. strategy instead has
been to rely on Pakistan's military to trap Bin Laden, a dependence
that Bush administration officials have cited while refusing to
pressure for access to Khan.

Musharraf complains that calls for international access to Khan show "a
lack of trust" in Pakistan, but his real problem is the scientist's
enormous popularity as the "father" of Pakistan's nuclear bomb program.
Khan "has been a hero for the masses," said the general who has
survived several assassination attempts and faces the possibility of a
revolt if he tilts too far toward the West.

Meanwhile, Bush is so eager to cater to Musharraf that he is even
championing the dictator as key to the creation of a democratic
Palestinian state "that is truly free. One that's got an independent
judiciary; one that's got a civil society; one that's got the capacity
to fight off the terrorists; one that allows for dissent; one in which
people can vote. And President Musharraf can play a big role in helping
achieve that objective."

What balderdash. None of those conditions of a free society exist in
Pakistan, nor are they likely any time soon in U.S.-occupied Iraq.

Yet while we chase the chimera of democratizing the Islamic world
through the use of force, the true cost of this crusade can be measured
by our indifference to our original justification of the Iraq invasion:
stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

And there's no margin for error here. Next time the terrorists could
take Manhattan and a whole lot more.
======================================================

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